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POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF SECTION 301?
Erwin P. Eichmann and Gary N. Horlick
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("Section 301")' has become
an increasingly potent and widely-used tool in the U.S. arsenal of trade
policy measures. The past few years have seen a proliferation of Sec-
tion 301 cases, affecting the trade of goods and services in Europe,
Asia, and Latin America. Even so, in the debate over the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("Omnibus Trade Act"), Con-
gress expressed impatience with the President's discretion in not un-
dertaking more Section 301 retaliations. 2 But while much attention
has focused on the politics and policy aspects of Section 301, little has
been discussed of the legal issues underpinning it.
Section 301 provides the President with broad authority to take
trade action against unfair foreign conduct. This fact, and experience
under Section 301, have promoted the perception that Congress effec-
tively abdicated its constitutional power over foreign commerce to the
President. But Congress certainly did not grant the President un-
checked powers over foreign trade. Quite the contrary, a closer exami-
nation of Section 301's statutory provisions reveals that Congress
expressly limited the exercise of the President's authority to specific
circumstances, particularly those which meet certain statutory defini-
tions. Under Section 301, the President may grant relief only from
"unfair" foreign trade practices. Since Congress has authorized action
only to rectify these specific foreign trade practices, the President may
be without authority if the foreign conduct falls outside of the statu-
tory definitions. Because the President cannot undertake peacetime
(i.e., nonemergency) trade action without Congressional authoriza-
tion, the President would have to rely on other statutory grants of
authority to impose any other action he may wish to take. This article
will argue that U.S. courts may be able to review Executive Branch
determinations of the "fairness" of foreign trade conduct as these de-
1. Trade Act of 1974, tit. III, § 301, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1982)).
2. Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amend-
ments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1988).
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terminations form the basis for Presidential authority under Section
301.
A major obstacle to judicial review of Section 301, though, is the
political question doctrine. Under this label, courts will not adjudicate
"political" issues: those which are nonjusticiable or would embarrass
the President in the conduct of foreign relations. This article will ana-
lyze the justiciability of the unfairness definitions and conclude that
while some of the criteria are easily justiciable, others may not be.
However, even if some of the statutory criteria are nonjusticiable, a
court may sever those questions that are nonjusticiable and continue
its review. Secondly, the analysis will reveal that the need for finality
of United States actions in foreign affairs causes the greatest political
question difficulties, but does not undercut the entire basis of judicial
reviewability.
Another obstacle to judicial review is the state secrets doctrine.
Under this doctrine, courts will not intrude into certain areas of na-
tional defense. This article will argue that courts can follow Supreme
Court precedent and use their discretion to separate state secrets from
trade matters and adjudicate questions of unfair trade conduct.
Section 301 carefully limits the President's discretion in setting
trade policy. Thus, the statutory criteria of Section 301 fall within
that category of questions that courts will review. The first section of
this article describes the limits of the President's authority under Sec-
tion 301. The second and third sections demonstrate that while polit-
ical question, jurisdictional, and state secrets issues provide some
serious questions, incantation of "foreign affairs" alone is not enough
to prevent judicial review.
I. THE NECESSITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF
EXECUTIVE TRADE ACTION
The President does not have an unlimited, unbridled foreign affairs
power.3 While the President may have a certain "very delicate, ple-
nary and exclusive power" in the field of international relations, 4 Con-
gress has explicit constitutional powers to "regulate Commerce with
3. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 64-65 (1972). As Justice Jack-
son wrote in his concurring opinion to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:
The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the forefa-
thers was the prerogative exercised by George II1, and the description of its evils in the
Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive
in his image.
343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (cited with approval in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662,
(1981)).
4. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1936).
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foreign Nations" and to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and
Excises." 5 Most commentators have interpreted this constitutional
balance so as to limit the Presidential power over peacetime interna-
tional trade to that available under an explicit or implicit grant from
Congress.
The Supreme Court has examined the limits of Congressional and
Executive powers in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer.6 In that
case, the Court invalidated President Truman's siezure of domestic
steel mills, even though Truman claimed that the continued operation
of the mills was necessary for the Korean War effort. Writing for the
court, Justice Black found that "[tihe President's power, if any, to is-
sue the order must stem from either an act of Congress or the Consti-
tution itself."' 7 Thus, under the reasoning of Black's majority opinion,
the President can only undertake such trade retaliation as Congress or
the Constitution has authorized.
Elaborating on Black's limitation of the President's powers, Justice
Jackson, in an oft-quoted concurrence to Youngstown, identified three
types of Presidential action. In the first category, as in the majority
opinion, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it in-
cludes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate." 8 Without Congressional authorization, Presidential action
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
6. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
7. Id. at 585. The Court's rationale for overturning the President's order appears to overturn
Justice Sutherland's dictum that gave the President an independent foreign relations power. Cur-
tiss- Wright, supra note 4, at 319-20. Sutherland had based the President's foreign relations power
on a transfer of sovereignty from the King of England to the President of the United States.
Justice Black, by finding that the President's power may only come from Congress or the Consti-
tution, implicitly overruled Sutherland's view of the President attaining power through the pas-
sage of sovereignty. However, Black never explicitly mentions or cites Curtiss-Wright, even
though it had been decided only sixteen years earlier.
8. Youngstown, supra note 3, at 635. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 670-89
(1981), where Justice Rehnquist minutely analyzed the Congressional intent behind the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. V 1987), and the
Hostages Act in upholding the President's settlement of the Iran hostage crisis. The Court evi-
dently would rather find Congressional authorization for the President's foreign affairs powers
than analyze a clash of authorizations.
See also Rehnquist and Stewart's comments during the oral argument of Dames & Moore.
Rehnquist was concerned that an unlimited foreign affairs power would allow the President to
negate provisions of the Bill of Rights. He asked, "What if the agreement provided that for one
year no one should criticize the Ayatollah?" The attorney for Iran replied, "Then the United
States would be obliged to attempt to accomplish that." Furthermore, as the Solicitor General's
theory of Presidential power appeared to provide no limits, Justice Powell remarked, "[t]he Pres-
ident could have exchanged you [Solicitor General Rex Lee] for one of the hostages - you or
me." N.Y. Times, June 25, 1981, at D3, col. 1, quoted in Nowak & Rotunda, A Comment on the
Creation and Resolution of a "Nonproblem:" Dames & Moore v. Regan, The Foreign Affairs
Power, and The Role of the Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1129, 1133 n.18 (1982).
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enters Jackson's latter two categories. In Jackson's second category,
"[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority." In Jackson's third category, "[w]hen the
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter."9
Jackson's three-category balancing test is based on the same under-
lying principles as Black's absolutist answer-that the Constitution
vests most federal powers in the Congress and that the President must
find some constitutional underpinning for his exercise of power, even
in foreign relations. Were the President to undertake trade retaliation
in the absence of Section 301 or other grant, such trade action would
have to rely on the President's inherent powers. Although the Presi-
dent has some inherent foreign affairs power over trade, the Constitu-
tion gives Congress explicit power over foreign trade, and a Court
would have to stretch constitutional theory to uphold Presidential
peacetime trade action without some Congressional authorization.10
Indeed, if the President could always act without any Congressional
authorization, then the President could effectively repeal any Congres-
sional trade enactment!
Several court decisions have reviewed Congressional authorization
for Presidential trade action. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the
Supreme Court analyzed Congressional authority for the President's
settlement of the Iran hostage crisis," and based the President's ac-
tions on Congressional acquiescence. Here, however, Congress has
spoken loudly and frequently about U.S. trade policy and recently nar-
rowed the President's discretion in using Section 301.12 In Yoshida
International,'3 the Customs Court examined Presidential power over
9. Youngstown, supra note 3, at 637.
10. See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953) (voiding an
executive agreement between the United States and Canada on potato imports that contradicted
a Congressional statute "because it was not authorized by Congress,"), aff'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 296 (1954); but see, Consumer's Union of United States v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding Presidential negotiation of steel import restraints because they "do
not purport to be enforceable, either as contracts or as governmental actions with the force of
law."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). While the President's actions in Consumer's Union
were unenforceable, Presidential retaliation under Section 301 may include tariff increases and is
enforceable.
11. See Dames & Moore, supra note 3.
12. Bello & Holmer, supra note 2, at 10-18.
13. Yoshida Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 378 F.Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974), rev'd 526 F.2d
560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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trade in interpreting section 255 of the Trade Expansion Act
("TEA"), the precursor to Section 301.14 The Customs Court held
that President Nixon had exceeded his authority in proclaiming a
tariff surcharge because "the authority granted by statute to 'termi-
nate, in whole or in part, any proclamation', does not include the
power to determine and fix unilaterally a rate of duty which has not
been previously legally established."' 5 The Appeals Court agreed,
noting that "no undelegated power to regulate commerce, or to set
tariffs, inheres in the Presidency."' 6 In another case, the Customs
Court overturned a tariff rate quota which the President established
after escape clause proceedings.' 7 The President had rejected the
Tariff Commission's recommendation on the matter, and the court
held that, under the statute, the President could not devise his own
remedy even if it accomplished the broad Congressional purpose.
Thus, the President could only accept or reject the Commission's
recommendation.
Yoshida, National Silver and Dames & Moore all contain the im-
plicit notion that the President must meet the statutory criteria before
he can invoke the powers delegated to him by Congress. In Yoshida,
the court found that the TEA did not enable the President to imple-
ment a tariff surcharge; instead it relied on the President's authority
during "any" period of national emergency as defined by the Trading
With the Enemy Act. t 8 In Dames & Moore, the Court found that an
emergency existed under IEEPA, but that Congress' explicit delega-
tion of authority was not broad enough for the President's actions;
instead, the Court found an implicit delegation through Congressional
acquiescence. Finally, in National Silver, the court overturned a Presi-
dential trade action as outside the Congressional delegation.
Not all scholars agree with the interpretation that limits Presiden-
tial action to explicit constitutional or Congressional grants. Some
would argue, based on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., ' 9
that the President has an independent foreign affairs power that allows
him to take trade action outside his enumerated powers. However,
Curtiss-Wright itself does not actually support that position. The sen-
tence containing Justice Sutherland's famous dictum, that the Presi-
14. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1885(b) (1980).
15. Yoshida, supra note 13, at 1162.
16. United States v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (reversing the
Customs Court on other grounds) (emphasis in original).
17. National Silver Co. v. United States, 388 F.Supp. 1391 (Cust. Ct. 1975).
18. 50 U.S.CA. app. § 5 (1982).
19. Supra note 4.
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dent has a "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power" in foreign
relations, also holds a significant qualifier--that this power "of course,
like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordina-
tion to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. ' 20 In context,
Sutherland's enunciation of the President's foreign relations power
may be no more than recognition of the President's particularized ex-
clusive powers, 2' instead of an expansion of generalizable Executive
powers. Indeed, one commentator has noted that the second half of
Sutherland's sentence effectively cancels the broad reach of the first
part because the reference to Constitutional provisions implies a limi-
tation on Presidential powers through the Neccesary and Proper
Clause.22
In addition, Sutherland's view of the alleged Presidential foreign
affairs power may no longer be good law as it has been rejected by the
Court and commentators alike. Sutherland based his view on a dubi-
ous interpretation of the transmission of sovereignty from England to
the United States:
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as
a unit, the powers of the external sovereignty passed from the Crown not
to the colonies severally but to the colonies in their collective and corpo-
rate capacity as the United States of America .... It results that the
investment of the Federal Government with the powers of external sov-
ereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution.23
First, this view is historically inaccurate. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Articles of Confederation, and contemporary writings
all indicate that sovereignty was to reside in the people, acting legisla-
tively through the individual states. 24 In contrast, the Constitution
intended a federal government of limited powers,25 such that the ves-
tiges of sovereignty could not have passed undetected to the Presi-
20. Id. at 320.
21. For example, the Constitution grants the President exclusive power to act as the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces. U.S. CONST. art. II.
22. Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92 Cong., Ist Sess., 18 (1971) (statement of Ruhl Bart-
lett, then Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University) [hereinafter
1971 Hearings] The Necessary and Proper Clause grants to Congress the power "(t)o make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art 1.
23. Curtiss-Wright, supra note 4, at 316.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. X; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. ("Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not in
this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.").
25. McCullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("the powers of government
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended.").
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dent.26  Second, the Court has rejected this view repeatedly by
declaring that the Constitution limits the powers of the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, both Youngstown and Dames and Moore rely on consti-
tutional grants of Presidential power; neither cite Curtiss-Wright for
its view of extra-constitutional powers. 27 Thus, if the President is to
have such an extra-constitutional foreign relations power, its basis
must be found outside a literal recitation of Curtiss-Wright's dictum.
In reviewing a Section 301 determination, a court must find the
statutory criteria and decide on the scope of Presidential authority
under it. A court could then examine the Presidential action to ascer-
tain whether it meets the criteria both procedurally and substantively,
and if the action does not, then it is beyond the President's Section 301
authority.
A. Section 301 Must Have An "Intelligible Principle."
Not every Congressional delegation to the President will withstand
judicial review.28
A constitutional delegation of powers requires that Congress enunciate a
policy or objective or give reasons for seeking the aid of the President.
In addition the act must specify when the powers conferred may be uti-
lized by establishing a standard or 'intelligible principle' which is suffi-
cient to make it clear when action is proper. . . . This means that
Congress must tell the President what he can do by prescribing a stan-
dard which confines his discretion and which will guarantee that any
authorized action he takes will tend to promote rather than flout the
legislative purpose.29
The "intelligible principle" test of proper constitutional delegation
has often arisen in the context of trade and tariff legislation. In the
foreign affairs context, courts have often upheld broad delegations as
proper.30 On the other hand, in the international trade context, a
26. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 22, at 17-18.
27. But see Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs. Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255, 1311 (1988) (arguing that "(c)oupled with Chadha
[I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)], Justice Rehnquist's statutory interpretation in Dames
and Moore radically undercuts Youngstown's vision of a balanced national security process ....
The decisions simultaneously strengthen the President vis-a-vis the judiciary by encouraging the
courts to apply a special measure of deference to executive acts in foreign affairs, a requirement
that Justice Jackson had soundly rejected in Youngstown itself.").
28. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1891) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and mainte-
nance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ("The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."), quoted in National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
29. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
30. See Dames & Moore, supra note 3, at 670 (upholding Presidential authority to regulate
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest"); Amalga-
Summer 1989]
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court may construe Congressional delegations more strictly since Con-
gress has explicit authority to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions. 31 Nevertheless, in a possible judicial review of Section 301, a
court would use the section's "intelligible principle" as a guidepost in
determining whether Presidential action is properly authorized.
B. Congress Has Delegated Broad, But Limited, Powers To Rectify
Unfair Foreign Trade Practices Under Section 301.
Although Congress drafted Section 301 with broad language, Con-
gress did not authorize the President to undertake any trade retalia-
tion at any time he pleases. Instead, the Presidential determination of
an unfair trade practice and injury to United States commerce delimits
the President's powers. While granting the President authority to sus-
pend, withdraw or prevent the application of any trade concession or
impose duties or other import restrictions on any product or service, 32
Congress limited when such remedies could be invoked. In particular,
the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") must take
mandatory action, "subject to the specific direction of the President,"
(a) to enforce rights under any trade agreement or (b) against any for-
eign act, policy or practice that (i) is inconsistent with or denies the
benefits of any trade agreement or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts United States commerce. 33 In addition, the USTR may take
discretionary action, subject to Presidential discretion, if any foreign
act, policy, or practice is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens
or restricts U.S. commerce. 34 If the foreign conduct does not meet this
threshold test, then the USTR cannot make a positive determination,
mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737
(D.D.C. 1971) (upholding the President's 1971 wage-price freeze as sufficiently following the
statutory will of Congress).
31. Even under Justice Sutherland's expansive view of Presidential power in Curtiss- Wright,
the President cannot act in trade matters without Congressional authorization. Sutherland's list
of implicit Presidential powers only includes "the powers to declare and wage war, to conclude
peace, to make treaties, [and] to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties." Curtiss-
Wright, supra note 4, at 318. But see Mast Ind., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F.Supp. 1567, 1575 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984) (upholding a Congressional delegation of power over trade and finding that
"[w]here Congress has given the President discretion in delegating authority in international
trade, the courts have uniformly sustained action by the Executive Branch against a claim that it
has exceeded the delegated authority."), aff'd 822 F.2d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(c) (Supp. V 1987).
33. S. 2613, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(a)(l) (1988). The USTR is not required to take
action (1) if dispute resolution proceedings under the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade
find no violation of U.S. trade rights, (2) if the foreign government is taking, has agreed to take,
or it is impossible for it to take appropriate measures, (3) if the retaliation would have an exces-
sive adverse impact on the U.S. economy, or (4) if the retaliation would cause serious harm to
U.S. national security. Id. at § 301(a)(2).
34. Id. at § 301(b).
[Vol. 10:735
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and the President has no authority to act.3 5 Following a positive deter-
mination, the USTR must take action within 30 days, unless the Presi-
dent directs otherwise. 36 Furthermore, the legislative history shows
that Congress intends the President to act upon positive USTR
determinations. 37
The statutory threshold test is crucial. If the petitioner does not
meet it, no relief can be granted because the statutory precondition to
Presidential authority has not been satisfied. Therefore, if the peti-
tioner does not meet the test and the President does take action with-
out another form of statutory authority, then the President enters the
third Jacksonian category where "the President acts in contravention
of the will of Congress, 'his power is at its lowest ebb,' and the Court
can sustain his actions 'only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject.' "38 Furthermore, if the petitioner meets the test,
then Congress did intend that an investigation be initiated; 39 if the
President does not investigate, then he would also be contravening the
legislative intent.
Assuming that the political question doctrine does not bar judicial
review of Section 301, 40 a court can review the merits of each peti-
tioner's case to determine whether the foreign trade practice passes the
threshold test. Even though Congress did not specify that Section 301
was intended to be subject to judicial review, the courts may legiti-
mately infer such a requirement. 41 After all, Congress has enacted a
statutory definition for an unfair trade practice under Section 301 and
"under the Constitution, one of the judiciary's characteristic roles is to
35. Id. at § 304(a)(1).
36. Id. at § 305(a)(1). The USTR may delay action up to 180 days after a positive determi-
nation upon specific circumstances. Id. at § 305(a)(2).
37. "The [Senate Finance] Committee intends that the President, under the amended law,
vigorously pursue appropriate action whenever necessary to enforce the rights of the United
States under a trade agreement or to respond to other unfair foreign acts, policies, or practices
determined by the USTR to be actionable under section 301." S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 80 (1987). Nevertheless, the statutory language does permit the President to direct the
USTR to take no action.
38. Dames & Moore, supra note 3, at 669 (quoting Youngstown, supra note 3, at 637-38).
39. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist. Sess. at 238 (1979) (the President's discretion "must be
exercised in light of the need to vigorously insure fair and equitable conditions for U.S. com-
merce, and in cases including the enforcement of U.S. rights under the agreements negotiated in
the MTN or where a petition has been filed requesting a response to an action inconsistent with
such agreements, this discretion normally should be exercised by proceeding to investigate and to
pursue valid claims in appropriate international fora when the petition properly presents issues
covered by Section 301....
40. See infra section II.
41. California v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979) (finding a right to a prerecoupment oral
hearing under § 204(a) of the Social Securities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1), even though the stat-
ute does not so require).
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interpret statutes, and [the judiciary] cannot shirk this responsibility
merely because [its] decision may have political overtones. '42
For example, the Supreme Court did not allow the political over-
tones of the Nicaraguan revolution to impinge on its adjudication of
asylum statutes for Nicaraguan refugees.4 3 There, the Court inter-
preted the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard under section
101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to mean a
subjective fear. Under the Court's view, refugees need not prove that
it is more likely than not that they would be persecuted upon return to
Nicaragua in order to be eligible for asylum. Indeed, the Court found
no constitutional constraint against interpreting the statute, even
though, as in Section 301, the Immigration and Nationality Act only
creates categories of refugees from which the Attorney General may,
at his discretion, grant asylum.44 Thus, if the foreign trade practice
does not pass the Section 301 test, then the President will have acted
without Congressional authorization, and such action may not pass
constitutional muster.4 5
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BARS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW: POLITICAL
QUESTION AND PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Courts have traditionally abstained from reviewing cases involving
foreign affairs on the grounds that they are "political questions."'46
42. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986); see also
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983) ("Resolution of liti-
gation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by
the courts because the issues have political implications..."). The legal and factual issues of
foreign trade conduct and Presidential retaliation should satisfy the court's jurisdictional require-
ment of "cases and controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
The court can make such a review once the determination becomes final. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 102-144.
43. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
45. Action without statutory authorization falls within Jackson's second category of concur-
rent authority where "congressional inertia, indifference or aquiescence may sometimes, at least
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility."
Youngstown, supra note 3, at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). For example, in Dames & Moore, the
court found that the President had acted outside of his explicit authorization but upheld the
action as constitutional in the face of Congressional acquiescence. Supra note 3, at 654. See W.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 317-21 (1988).
Here, unlike the negotiation for hostage release at issue in Dames & Moore, Congress has not
backed into acquiescence of Administration trade policy, judging from Congressional changes in
Section 301 in 1988 which were subsequently vetoed. Since Congress has explicitly defined un-
fair trade conduct under Section 301 and recently reworked the definition to limit Presidental
discretion, Presidential action outside the statutory guidelines would contravene the will of Con-
gress and fall within Jackson's third category of presumably impermissible action. See Bello &
Holmer, supra note 2, at 10-18.
46. See e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
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Nevertheless, "it is 'error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.' 47
Although commentators generally agree that there is a constitutional
basis to the political question doctrine,48 they disagree as to its nature
and scope. 49 Justice Brennan, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, has
described the doctrine as having "attributes which, in various settings,
diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness." 50
Nonetheless, Brennan's six factor test has become the standard for
political question analysis:'
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according
to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political ques-
tion, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essen-
tially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Questions, in their nature political ... can never be
made in this court").
47. Japan Whaling Ass'n, supra note 42, at 2866 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962)); Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1379, 1407 (1988) ("The 'political question doctrine' is a little like the Holy Roman Empire. It
doesn't have much to do with whether the question is 'political' in any ordinary sense...").
Professor Ely notes that adjudication of "political cases" is entirely in line with the rather
plain intent of the Constitution, which lists among the heads of federal judicial jurisdiction cases
arising under treaties, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, cases
in admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, and cases to which the United States and/or foreign na-
tions are parties-and indicates further that treaties shall be the supreme law of the land "and
the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby." Id. at 1409 n.88.
48. But see Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976).
Professor Louis Henkin has argued that the leading cases on the political question doctrine
should instead be understood as determinations that the President's decisions were within his
authority, and that the holdings were justified on their merits. Id. at 612; Henkin, Viet-Nam in
the Courts of the United States. "Political Questions", 63 AM J. INT'L L. 284, 286 (1969) ("In
regard to foreign affairs, I believe, the Supreme Court has never found a true 'political ques-
tion,' "); but see Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, & 1514 n.50, 1515 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (explicitly rejecting Henkin's assertions).
49. See, e.g., Note, The General 'Political Question 'Doctrine and the Foreign Relations Power:
The Parameters of the 'Political Question' Doctrine, in T. FRANK & M. GLENNAN, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 723 (1987).
50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
51. Champlin & Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs
Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 220 (1985); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-99 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring).
Summer 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
on one question. 52
The Constitution textually allocates international trade to the Con-
gress in article 1, section 8.13 Assuming arguendo that the Constitu-
tion does not allocate international trade entirely to either the
legislature or executive, the five remaining factors of the test for Sec-
tion 301 collapse to but two: justiciability (factors 2 and 3), and em-
barrassment (factors 4, 5 and 6). 54
In Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, the D.C. Circuit also used a
three-step approach to identify nonjusticiable political questions and
asked:
(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the
text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii)
Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond ar-
eas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention?55
Writing for the court, Judge Wilkey found a justiciable controversy
where a United States citizen alleged that United States government
officials had unconstitutionally occupied and established a military
training camp on his property in Honduras. The Court found that
such a dispute over property would necessitate interpretation of the
Constitution and of federal statutes, a quintessential task of the judici-
ary, and would not involve Executive embarrassment because the
plaintiffs did not challenge U.S. foreign policy in Central America,
only the Executive's taking of private property. 56 In a potential review
of Section 301, judicial adjudication would likewise necessitate statu-
tory interpretation involving a narrow injury to private property, not
an assault on U.S. foreign policy.5 7
To determine whether Section 301 decisions are barred from re-
view by the political question doctrine, this article will examine
52. Baker v. Carr, supra note 50, at 217.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Congress shall 'regulate commerce with foreign nations'); but see
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (reducing the scope of the textual commitment
prong).
54. In essence, factors two and three both go to the ability of the judiciary to resolve the
question, and factors four, five and six consider the need for speed and finality in international
relations and the possibility of embarrassment for both the courts and the executive if the courts
were to overturn the President. See Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 51, at 221 (the Baker test
collapses to two factors); Goldwater, supra note 51, at 999-1001 (reducing the test to three fac-
tors) (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Ramirez, supra note 48, at 1511 (quoting Goldwater, supra note 51, at 998), vacated and
rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). Ramirez was vacated because changed circum-
stances effectively mooted the factual issues.
56. Ramirez, supra note 48, at 1511-14.
57. Moreover, courts have routinely adjudicated the existence or non-existence of hostili-
ties-a quintessential "political question"-for the purpose of war risk clauses in insurance con-
tracts. Ely, supra note 47, at 1408 n.87, 1409 (listing cases).
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whether each factual determination underlying a Section 301 unfair
trade practice is incapable of judicial resolution or would cause gov-
ernmental embarrassment.
A. Justiciability
The justiciability factor analyzes whether a court can find "discov-
erable and manageable standards" with which to analyze the ques-
tion;58 if the court cannot, then the question is political. Section 301
grants the President authority to retaliate for violations of any trade
agreement or foreign conduct which is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or
discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce. 59
Each of these tests is arguably justiciable.
1. Violation of a Trade Agreement
The President can act to "enforce the rights of the United States
under any trade agreement" or to respond to foreign trade practices
that are "inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise den[y] bene-
fits to the United States under, any trade agreement." 6 The United
States Trade Representative has interpreted "trade agreement" to in-
clude only the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
and any of the GATT codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round.61
The definition generally does not extend to treaties of friendship, com-
merce and navigation ("FCN") and agreements peripherally related to
trade. 62
58. Baker, supra note 50, at 217. For example, purely legal questions of statutory interpreta-
tion are justiciable, even if accompanied by significant political dimensions. Japan Whaling
Ass'n. v. American Cetacean Soc'y., supra note 42, at 2866 (finding justiciable a challenge to the
Secretary of Commerce's decision not to certify Japan for harvesting sperm whales in excess of
International Whaling Commission quotas); Romer v. Carlucci, No. 86-1458, slip op. (8th Cir.
May 18, 1988) (en banc) (finding justiciable the environmental impact statements filed by the Air
Force in conjunction with the proposed deployment of MX missiles in Colorado and Nebraska).
In addition, once the Court accepts the issue for adjudication, it may have a duty to fashion
manageable standards. "Thus manageability is certainly a consideration, but principally at the
stage of devising principles and remedies as opposed to the stage of deciding whether to decide
the issue at all." Ely, supra note 47, at 1408; cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124-25
(1980).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
60. Id.
61. Bello and Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and
Developments, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633, 635 (1986) (for a list of GATT codes which fall
under "trade agreement," see id., at 634 n.4).
62. Id. The USTR chose the limited construction of "trade agreement" because § 303(a) of
the 1974 Trade Act requires the Trade Representative to request "formal dispute settlement
procedures" for violations of a "trade agreement." 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. V 1987). Since
non-GATT agreements typically call for dispute resolution through the International Court of
Justice, the USTR has consistently construed "trade agreements" narrowly in the belief that
Congress did not intend § 303(a) to compel resolution in the World Court. Bello and Holmer,
supra note 61, at 634 n.4.
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Courts should have no problems of justiciability in analyzing viola-
tions of GATT.63 In fact, U.S. courts have already interpreted provi-
sions of GATT in various settings. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States,64 the U.S. Supreme Court found the Treasury Department's
interpretation of countervailing duty laws consistent with article VI(3)
of the GATT. In United States v. Star Industries, Inc. 65, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals found that the context and negotiating
history of article XXVIII(3) required withdrawal of concessions to
conform to the most-favored-nation principle. In Sneaker Circus, Inc.
v. Carter66, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that, although GATT violations were nonactionable with-
out statutory implementation, article XIX(l)(a) permitted the Orderly
Marketing Arrangement negotiated by the President. Moreover, the
Court of International Trade has formally introduced GATT into
American trade jurisprudence. The Court held that Congressional
statutes "should not be interpreted by means of a tenuous argument to
yield a construction which would be in contravention of GATT. '67
Thus, the Court of International Trade now looks to the GATT to
interpret trade provisions where Congress has not explicitly legislated.
As the GATT is a legalistic treaty with an extensive negotiating his-
tory, and is amenable to standard rules of statutory construction, U.S.
courts could easily find legal standards with which to discover viola-
tions of the GATT.
2. Unjustifiable or Discriminatory Conduct
Congress has defined foreign unjustifiability in Section 301 as "any
act, policy or practice which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the
international legal rights of the United States."' 68 Unjustifiability in-
cludes the denial of national or most-favored-nation ("MFN") treat-
ment, the right to establish an enterprise abroad, protection of
intellectual property rights, 69 or the breach of an agreement other than
a trade agreement (such as an FCN treaty). 70 The definition of dis-
criminatory action parallels that of unjustifiability and includes "any
63. See Japan Whaling Ass'n, supra note 42, at 2866 ("the courts have authority to construe
treaties and executive agreements").
64. 437 U.S. 443, 458 (1978).
65. 462 F.2d 557, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
66. 457 F.Supp. 771, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd 614 F.2d 1290 (1979).
67. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 496, 501-02 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal
dismissed, 792 F.2d 1101 (1986).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
69. Id., at § 241 1(e)(4)(B).
70. Bello & Holmer, supra note 61, at 640.
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act, policy, or practice which denies national or most-favored-nation
treatment to United States goods, services, or investment."' 7'
MFN treatment in FCN treaties is not substantially different from
MFN treatment in the GATT and should be justiciable by courts;
their terms are as capable of judicial review as the GATT terms ana-
lyzed above.72 For example, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals analyzed the U.S.-Germany FCN treaty and voided a 50 percent
tariff as inconsistent with the treaty.73 Recent examples of unjus-
tifiability findings involve the United States-Korea and United States-
Japan FCN Treaties. In a Section 301 proceeding involving the Re-
public of Korea's domestic restrictions of foreign insurance compa-
nies, the President found unjustifiability in a violation of article VII of
the FCN treaty.74 Similarly, the President found the state-sponsored
Japanese tobacco monopoly to be unjustifiable because of a violation of
the United States-Japan FCN treaty. 75 To the extent that unjus-
tifiability provisions concern the protection of intellectual property
rights, courts already examine foreign treatment of intellectual prop-
erty rights under section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act,76 and they should
have little difficulty adjudicating slightly broader questions of those
rights under Section 301.
Unjustifiable foreign trade practices may also theoretically include
foreign conduct other than the denial of MFN treatment, and as the
definition appears open-ended, the USTR could possibly fit any for-
eign conduct within the definition. Courts could consider overturning
such a stretching of the definition in either of two ways. First, if the
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2411l(e)(5) (Supp. V 1987).
72. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 27 U.N.T.S. 19, art. I (MFN treatment "with respect to customs duties and
charges of any kind"), art. III (MFN treatment for internal taxes and regulations); see also Men-
tula v. State Land Bd., 244 Or. 229, 233, 417 P.2d 581 (1966) (adjudicating the MFN clause in
the United States-Finland FCN treaty).
73. John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 104 F.2d 67 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
74. Memorandum of Aug. 14, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Determina-
tion Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,443 (1986). Article VII of the
treaty provides that:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment with respect
to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other activities for gain
(business activities) within the territories of the other Party, whether directly or by agent or
through the medium of any form of lawful juridical entity.
Nov. 28, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; for a detailed treatment of the incident, see
Bello & Holmer, supra note 61, at 640-41.
75. See Japan's Practice With Respect to the Manufacture, Importation and Sale of Tobacco
Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (USTR 1985) (initiation), based on United States-Japan Treaty of
Friendship, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1987). For a general analysis, see Walders, Other Import
Relief Laws in THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979-FouR YEARS LATER 255 (H. Appel-
baum & A. Victor eds. 1983).
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foreign conduct falls just slightly outside an existing category, a court
could find that Congress intended such conduct not to be a violation of
Section 301. Second, a court could decide what are "the international
legal rights of the United States ' 77 and then decide whether the for-
eign conduct violated them.78
3. Unreasonable Conduct
Section 301 defines unreasonableness to mean "any act, policy, or
practice which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent
with the international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise
deemed to be unfair and inequitable; ' 79 the statute explicitly makes
reference to foreign action regarding market opportunities, opportuni-
ties for establishing an enterprise and intellectual property protec-
tion.80  Since neither Congressional statute nor international
agreement explicitly defines the boundaries of unreasonableness in for-
eign trade, courts may have difficulty in its adjudication because
courts generally defer review on precisely these issues where delicate,
non-legal choices of foreign relations must be made.8'
The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act provides courts with an aid in defin-
ing unreasonableness. The Act defies unreasonable foreign actions to
include the denial of various trade opportunities, foreign government
export targeting and substandard labor safeguards. 82 Courts may find
77. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(e)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
78. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."); Ra-
mirez de Arellano, supra note 48, at 1540 ("When, however, the political branches have specified
the controlling legal principles in a treaty with the foreign sovereign or when there are generally
accepted tenets of international law concerning the foreign act, the danger of improper judicial
interference with the Executive's responsibilities for foreign affairs is greatly reduced."); but see
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d. 1446, 1455 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986) (Sus-
taining the President's authority "to disregard international law in service of domestic
needs..."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
79. 19 U.S.C. 2411 (e)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
80. Id.
81. U.S. courts do not inquire into the termination of treaties, the recognition of foreign
governments, the recognition of belligerency abroad, a person's status as a foreign government
representative or the dates of duration of hostilities. Baker, supra note 50, at 212-13.
82. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1988). Section 301(d)(3)(b) of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 defines unreasonable acts, policies or practices
to include any combination which
(i) denies fair and equitable-
(1) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise, (11) provision of adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights, or (Ill) market opportunities ...
(ii) constitutes export targeting, or
(iii) constitutes a persistent pattern of conduct that-
(1) denies workers the right of association, (II) denies workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively, (III) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor, (IV) fails to
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adequate guidance to adjudicate the Act's definitions by analogy from
similar provisions in current antitrust, labor and intellectual property
law. The Act, however, also exempts foreign countries which take "ac-
tions that demonstrate a significant and tangible overall advancement"
in providing trade and for conduct which is "not inconsistent with the
level of economic development of the foreign country."'8 3 These ex-
emptions may be unjusticiable, particularly those for overall advance-
ment in trade policy and consistency with economic development
levels because they call for non-legal "political" choices.
In addition, several commentators have advanced guidelines for
reasonableness under Section 301. One method would use the norma-
tive definition of reasonableness and decide whether foreign conduct is
undertaken in bad faith, regardless of any justifications which may be
posited. 84 Another method would weigh the economic distortion of
comparative advantage against the legal exercise of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and find those practices reasonable which favor comparative ad-
vantage.85 A court could fashion guidelines based on the definitions of
reasonableness from commentators or from other areas of the law.
On the other hand, the courts could find the question justiciable
and then defer to the President's findings in most circumstances:
Both Supreme Court and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals pre-
cedent have established that the Executive's decisions in the sphere of
international trade are reviewable only to determine [1] whether the
President's action falls within his delegated authority, [2] whether the
statutory language has been properly construed, and [3] whether the
President's action conforms with the relevant procedural requirements.
The President's findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not
subject to review.8 6
Deference to the President's findings would not be applicable to all
trade determinations. For certain unfair trade practices, Section 301
on its face requires mandatory action, 87 and the courts could review
the President's actions against the statute. For discretionary actions,
the courts can still review the President's actions for statutory compli-
provide a minimum age for the employment of children, or (V) fails to provide standards
for minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of workers.
83. Id. § 301(d)(3)(C).
84. Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters
of Goods, Services and Capital, 14 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 569, 598 (1982).
85. Hansen, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade.: Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122, 1136-42 (198"7) (offering the most perceptive insight into the statu-
tory standards).
86. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omit-
ted) (construing the reviewability of section 504 withdrawal of duty-free treatment under the
Generalized System of Preferences).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
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ance and due process claims under the Fifth Amendment. 88 After all,
"[t]he Executive's power to conduct foreign relations free from the
unwarranted supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive
carte blanche to trample the most fundamental liberty and property
rights of this country's citizenry." 8 9
Courts have reviewed some aspects of Presidential discretion in es-
cape clause proceedings. In section 201 trade relief, the International
Trade Commission ("ITC") determines whether increases in imports
have seriously injured a domestic industry or threaten the industry
with serious injury;90 after receiving an affirmative finding from the
ITC, the President may provide import relief.9' Although the section
grants no explicit judicial review, courts have reviewed section 201
relief to confirm that there was not "a clear misconstruction of the
governing statute, a significant procedural violation, or action outside
delegated authority." 92
Courts have also reviewed Presidential authority for trade relief
against unfair practices under section 337. Section 337 of the 1930
Tariff Act prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation of articles into the United States" where the im-
ports may destroy, substantially injure or prevent the establishment of
88. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (overturning the Civil Service Com-
mission's citizenry requirement as an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1938) (finding that the quasi-
judicial character of administrative proceedings give rise to the "requirements of fair play").
USTR rule-making, though, is arguably not subject to the strictures of the Administrative
Procedures Act (the "APA") and would not come under Hampton and Morgan. Section
553(a)(1) of the APA exempts from notice and comment certain rulemaking "to the extent that
there is involved a military or foreign affairs function of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)
(1982). International trade policy, including Section 301 proceedings, may fall under the excep-
tion. See Mast Ind., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F.Supp. 1567, 1580 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (interim textile
import regulations fall within the "foreign affairs" exception of the APA). However, the legisla-
tive history of the APA would not support a broad view of the "foreign affairs" exemption to
include all aspects of Section 301. The House and Senate Reports to the APA specifically cau-
tioned that:
The phrase "foreign affairs functions" used here and in some other provisions of the bill, is
not to be loosely interpreted to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the
United States, but only those "affairs" which so affect relations with other governments that,
for example, public rulemaking provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable in-
ternational consequences.
Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 191,
199 (Senate Report), 257 (House Report) (1947). Moreover, the courts have continually con-
strued section 553 exemptions from rulemaking procedures, including the "foreign affairs" ex-
ception, narrowly and granted them reluctantly. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v.
Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
89. Ramirez, supra note 48, at 1515.
90. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1980).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1980).
92. Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding the
President's actions).
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an industry.93 The ITC is given explicit authority to determine viola-
tions of this section 94 and has adjudicated claims of unfair imports
involving patent claims, trademark infringements, false designations of
goods, passing off goods, and misappropriation of trade secrets.95 Af-
ter an affirmative ITC determination, the President then has sixty days
to reject the relief for "policy reasons" before it takes effect. 96 Courts
have reviewed whether the ITC's definitions and standards of unfair
imports are "reasonable in light of the language, policy, and legislative
history of the statute" and whether the factual finding is supported by
substantial evidence;97 however, the courts have not reviewed the sub-
sequent Presidential decision. 98
Section 301 relief is bifurcated similarly to that of sections 201 and
337 and may also be reviewed. A court could examine whether the
USTR's determination comports with the language, policy, and legis-
lative history of the statute, whether the determination is supported by
any (or substantial) evidence, and whether the determination exceeds
the USTR's delegated authority. If the USTR determination meets
these three tests, it would stand. The subsequent Presidential action,
however, might be unreviewable.
Finally, even if a court finds the standard of "unreasonable" to be
nonjusticiable and thus a political question, Section 301 as a whole
would not necessarily be unreviewable. If "unreasonable" is severable
from the other elements of Section 301, then a court cannot dismiss
the entire challenge because of the presence of a political question.
The doctrine "is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.'
The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional au-
thority." 99 Thus, each element of a Section 301 challenge must be
nonjusticiable in order for the entire challenge to be labeled as a polit-
ical question.
In sum, the courts could follow either of two alternatives for the
justiciability of unreasonableness. First, they could declare unreasona-
bleness to be unjusticiable, hence a political question, and retain re-
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
94. Id. § 1337(c).
95. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause:
The Case For Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 131 (1987).
96. 19 U.S.C. § 133 7 (g)(2) (1982).
97. Corning Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
98. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
99. Baker, supra note 50, at 217.
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view for the other procedural and substantive aspects of Section 301
determinations. For example, a court could find unreasonableness to
be a political question but retain review to determine whether the con-
duct burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. Second, the court could find
unreasonableness to be justiciable and subject to review.
4. Burden or Restriction on U.S. Commerce
For unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign conduct,
the USTR must make a further injury determination that the conduct
"burdens or restricts" United States commerce. This injury require-
ment can be demonstrated through increased imports into the United
States, reduced availability of raw material imports into the United
States, the displacement of United States export sales, in either the
country engaged in an unfair trade practice or in a third-country mar-
ket, or an inadequate protection of intellectual property rights.'o
The "burdens or restricts" requirement is similar to the injury de-
termination under antidumping and countervailing duty laws.' 10 To
impose antidumping duties and countervailing duties for GATT Sub-
sidies Code signatories, the ITC must determine that the domestic in-
dustry is "materially injured" or "threatened with material injury" or
its establishment is "materially retarded."' 1 2 The ITC's findings are
explicitly subject to judicial review and have encountered no political
question problems. '0 3 If courts can find legal standards with which to
review ITC decisions of material injury and threat to material injury,
then they should be able to find legal standards with which to deter-
mine if a practice "burdens or restricts" U.S. commerce.
B. Prudential and Jurisdictional Considerations
Courts have refused to adjudicate political question issues because
of article III constitutional problems or prudential issues. First, a
court may only hear such challenges to Section 301 actions that in-
volve an article III "case or controversy." Then, even after finding the
challenge ripe for adjudication, a court may decline to hear it because
of a need for the finality of political decisions in foreign affairs or be-
cause of potential embarrassment from "multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question."' 1 4 Indeed, once the Presi-
100. Bello & Holmer, supra note 61, at 644-45.
101. See Note, ITC Injury Determinations in Countervailing Duty Investigations, 15 L. &
POL. INT'L Bus. 987 (1983).
102. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2) (Supp. V 1987).
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (Supp. V 1987).
104. Baker, supra note 50, at 217.
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dent undertakes trade negotiations or retaliation against foreign con-
duct, he could be severely embarrassed by a judicial recall.
On the other hand, mere Presidential embarrassment has not been
enough to keep the court out of political conflicts. President Truman
did remove the National Guard from the steel mills during the Korean
war, President Eisenhower complied with school desegregation orders
with which he personally disagreed, and President Nixon made public
the tape recordings which doomed his presidency. 10 5 Even in adjudi-
cating the Iran Hostages Agreement, where the United States' credi-
bility in the Middle East was on the line, the court did not dismiss the
suit through an embarrassment rationale. 106 In fact, in one case, the
court even cited to itself for the proposition that disobedience to the
court's orders is unthinkable. 10 7
This analysis of prudential considerations, though, is more com-
plex. It is uncertain when a petitioner would challenge the Section 301
proceedings, if the challenge would be ripe at that point and whether
finality problems would affect the decision of ripeness. Three distinct
possibilities exist for the timing of actions challenging section 301: af-
ter a negative USTR determination, after a positive USTR determina-
tion, and after USTR action. Each of these scenarios may have
embarrassment difficulties. Furthermore, there may be standing
problems if a court were to find no "case or controversy" under any of
the scenarios.
A court can review a final administrative action that "determines a
'right or obligation' so that 'legal consequences' will flow from it.'"108
In addition, courts should not adjudicate premature, non-ripe cases so
as to avoid "entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over ad-
ministrative policies."' 0 9 Assuming arguendo that a court would con-
duct judicial review of USTR determinations of foreign trade
practices, the complaint could be brought immediately after USTR
makes a determination. 1 0 If the USTR finds no unfairness in the for-
eign conduct, then the President will have taken no action and a court
cannot embarrass the President through overturning a Presidential ac-
tion. The concerns of finality and embarrassment would be moot for
105. Ely, supra note 47, at 1410 ("That the President will disobey an order of the Supreme
Court seems less likely in 1988 than it might have 100 years ago.").
106. Dames & Moore, supra note 3, at 654.
107. Powell v. McCormack, supra note 53, at 549 n.86 (1969) ("The Court has noted that it
is an 'inadmissable suggestion' that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial determina-
tion.") (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1982)).
108. Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202, 205 (1960).
109. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
110. Time limits for USTR determinations are found at 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1980).
Summer 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
negative determinations. Furthermore, the petitioner who initiated
the USTR investigation would have standing as she has been injured
by the lack of relief.
Under the second scenario, a court could decide to accept the case
before the USTR granted actual relief. Following a positive USTR
determination, the USTR must implement the action it recommended
within 30 days, unless the President directs otherwise. 1'' Since the
USTR need not grant any actual relief after the 30-day period, if the
President so directs,' 12 the reviewing court will not necessarily embar-
rass the Executive. Moreover, the USTR decision to take action pro-
vides enough injury to create a "case or controversy." First, since the
USTR's formal decision to take action will lead to some form of retali-
ation, importers, and foreign businesses will be injured." 3 Second,
even if the President decides not to take any current action, the deci-
sion itself affects the parties by pressuring the foreign government to
reach a settlement. 14
If the court accepts the suit immediately after the 30-day period,
then the President may not yet have taken any trade action and em-
barrassment will not be an issue. The case, though, may remain in
court for some length of time, potentially tying Presidential discretion
during the review period. Although the President may not like having
his hands tied by the courts, the length of law suits usually does not
cause a court to deny legal or equitable relief.'' 5 If Congress truly
intended the President to take action only under specified circum-
stances, without any check on the speediness of Presidential action,
then delay in court should not trouble the judicial review. Moreover,
Section 301 is not necessary to provide relief for true emergency situa-
tions; other trade acts, including IEEPA' 16, provide explicit Presiden-
111. S. 2613, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(a) (1988). The USTR may delay the implementa-
tion of action for up to 180 days under specified circumstances. Id.
112. Bello and Holmer, supra note 61, at 652.
113. Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) ("Where the inevitability
of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of
a justiciable controversy that there be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into
effect .... 'One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preven-
tive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.' " (quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) (citations omitted)).
114. Bello and Holmer, supra note 61, at 652.
115. See, e.g., SSIH Equipment, S.A. v. International Trade Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1387, 1391
(C.C.P.A. 1982). The SSIH court held that under statutory construction of section 337 proceed-
ings, "there is no fixed time limits on appeals from final determinations of the [International
Trade] Commission." Congress, though, wanted speedier resolution of section 337 actions and
instituted a 60-day cap. Trade Act of 1984 § 413, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (West Supp. 1988). More-
over, if the need arose, the court could conduct an expedited review.
116. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982). For a
description of practice under IEEPA, see Koh, supra note 27, at 1264-65 (arguing that recent
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tial authority for fast trade relief.
The Omnibus Trade Act is persuasive authority toward finding
ripeness after a positive USTR determination. First, the Act requires
the President to take mandatory action for certain unfair trade prac-
tices. 117 Under the amendments to Section 301, the USTR "shall take
action,... subject to the specific discretion, of the President regarding
any such action, and shall take all other appropriate and feasible ac-
tion within the powers of the President that the President may direct
the Trade Representative to take" after a positive determination of any
unfair trade practice which (i) violates, is inconsistent with, or denies
benefit under any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens
or restricts United States commerce. 18 If a positive USTR determina-
tion would lead to mandatory action, then such a determination would
cause an actual injury and satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of
ripeness. '19
Furthermore, the Act's provision of mandatory retaliation, subject
to Presidential disapproval, duplicates the procedure for section 337
relief, and courts have found section 337 determinations ripe for re-
view. Under section 337, the President has sixty days to reject an af-
firmative ITC determination before it takes effect. 120 Courts have
found section 337 determinations ripe after the President formally dis-
approves or the sixty-day period lapses. 21 If section 337 mandatory
trade relief ripens once the President disapproves or fails to act, then
Section 301 mandatory retaliation would also become ripe once the
President disapproves or fails to act.
Second, the Act clarifies the distinctions between the standard for
USTR determinations and the standard for Presidential determina-
tions. If the USTR determination of unfairness is made on a different
standard than the Presidential determination, then the courts could
resolve disputes over the USTR determinations, even if the President
court decisions have transformed IEEPA into a sweeping delegation of authority); see also Na-
tional Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982).
117. "Subject to specified exceptions, action is mandatory." S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 80 (1987).
118. S. 2613, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1391 (1988) (emphasis added) The USTR, though, is
not required to take mandatory action if (i) a GATT dispute resolution proceeding finds no
violation of an international trade agreement with respect to the United States, (ii) USTR finds
that the foreign country is, will, or cannot take satisfactory measures to provide the rights of the
trade agreement or compensatory trade benefits, (iii) USTR action would have an adverse domes-
tic economic impact in proportion to its benefits, or (iv) national security concerns militate
against retaliation. Id.
119. But see Bello & Holmer, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing that the mandatory provisions of
the 1988 Act still allow "ample discretion").
120. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
121. Duracell, supra note 98, at 1578.
Summer 19891
Michigan Journal of International Law
might later have discretion to reject them. 122 As Congress explicitly
allocated certain decisions to the USTR instead of the President, Con-
gress intended the USTR to make independent decisions. 123 More-
over, by acting in a quasi-judicial role, not an Executive one, USTR
proceedings must comply with due process standards.124 In adopting
a standard of review, the courts could conduct a de novo review of
USTR determinations, or else could treat USTR as a quasi-adminis-
trative agency and apply administrative law doctrine to USTR deter-
minations. Under either standard, USTR determinations would be
reviewable.
The Federal Circuit has analyzed similar issues of standing in up-
holding an importer's challenge of a Customs Service classification
under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). 25 Florsheim,
a shoe importer, had filed a petition with the USTR to create a sepa-
rate category for water buffalo leather and asked for duty-free treat-
ment of the leather pursuant to the GSP. The USTR denied the
petition. Florsheim filed several protests with the Customs Service,
and the Customs Service denied its petitions. Florsheim then brought
suit pursuant to section 514 of the 1930 Tariff Act. Both the Court of
International Trade and the Federal Circuit held that Florsheim had
standing.
The Federal Circuit found two rationales for standing. First, the
court held that an importer had standing under a Congressional stat-
ute. 126 The court, though, also examined the government's contention
that "the existence of 28 U.S.C. § 2531 [the statute granting standing]
does not obviate the fact that Section 504's zone of interests does not
encompass importers such as Florsheim."' 127 The court used a "zone
of interests" standing analysis 28 and found that Congress had in-
122. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (finding justiciable a controversy
between two officials of the Executive Branch, namely the President and the Special Prosecutor).
123. See S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1987) (The determination whether for-
eign conduct is an unfair practice actionable under Section 301 "should be the province of the
USTR, rather than the President, because it is a technical decision calling for the application of
USTR's experience to the provisions of Section 301 and the particular practices at issue." (em-
phasis added)); see also Bello & Holmer, supra note 2, at 2-10.
124. See Hampton, supra note 88, at 88; Morgan, supra note 88, at 14-15. Sub-executive
agencies must follow the rule of law, including due process, even where the President has full
discretion.
125. Florsheim, supra note 86, at 787.
126. "A civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515
of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person
who filed the protest pursuant to section 514 of such Act." 28 U.S.C. § 263 1(a) (Supp. V 1987).
127. Florsheim, supra note 86, at 790.
128. " 'Zone of interests' is a shorthand description of a test for standing, requiring that a
complainant show that the interest it seeks to protect is 'arguably within the zone of interests to
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tended importers to challenge Customs Service determinations so that
the challenge fell within the requisite zone of interests.
The Court, though, did not question whether Congress may ex-
pand a court's jurisdiction if no "case or controversy" exists. Since
Congress cannot create standing if no "case or controversy" exists,129
a statutory definition of ripeness cannot expand a court's jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit's basis of standing on a Congressional statute is
therefore irrelevant, and the holding must stand on the "zone of inter-
ests" analysis.' 30 Since a potential review of Section 301 determina-
tions is similar to a review of GSP classifications in that, in both cases,
the President retains discretion to overturn the agency finding,131 the
Federal Circuit's Florsheim analysis would equally apply to questions
of ripeness for Section 301 determinations.
In the third scenario, a court could reject the complaint as not ripe
until USTR and the President actually grant trade relief.132 In an
analogous situation, several senators brought suit against President
Carter's termination of a treaty with Taiwan. In that case, Justice
Powell found that the controversy was not ripe because "a dispute
between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review
unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitu-
tional authority."' 33 In a Section 301 action, the court could await
Presidential action before undertaking judicial review. But, once the
President has acted, the need for finality and lack of embarrassment
would strongly suggest against judicial review.
Nevertheless, courts have overturned Presidential actions involv-
ing foreign affairs. For example, in Guy Capps, the Supreme Court
voided an executive agreement between the United States and Canada
on potato imports. 34 Moreover, if the courts could never overturn a
Presidential action involving foreign affairs, then the President could
be protected or regulated by the statute of constitutional guarantee in question.' " Id. at 790
(citations to U.S. Supreme Court cases omitted).
129. Buckley, supra note 42, at 11 ("Congress may not, of course, require this court to render
opinions in matters which are not 'cases or controversies.' ").
130. See Canadian Meat Council v. United States, 644 F.Supp. 1125 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)
(upholding the statutory definition of standing for Department of Commerce final affirmative
subsidy determinations under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987)). 1
131. "The President may withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of the duty-free treat-
ment accorded under section 501 [GSP treatment] with respect to any article or with respect to
any country." 19 U.S.C. § 2464(a) (Supp. 1988).
132. See Buckley, supra note 42, at 13-14; see also Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1948) ("administrative orders are not reviewable
unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right or fix some legal relationship as a con-
summation of the administrative process.")
133. Goldwater, supra note 51, at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
134. Guy Capps, supra note 10, at 655; but see Koh, supra note 27, at 1306-17.
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always unilaterally form trade policy without either Congressional or
judicial intervention.
To determine whether a question is ripe, a court could use stan-
dard principles of administrative law, particularly those applicable to
other forms of trade relief. The ripeness doctrine in administrative law
prevents courts from "entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies" and "protect[s] the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."' 135
In antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, ripeness of
judicial review is explicitly governed by statute. Petitioners can con-
test final affirmative and negative determinations, determinations of a
duty suspension or an injurious effect, and determinations of classes of
merchandise. 136 The Court of International Trade has upheld the leg-
islature's choice of ripeness under article III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion 137 and has reviewed the determinations under the statutory
scheme. 3 In section 337 unfair practice proceedings, Congress de-
clared that ITC determinations become final after either a 60-day pe-
riod or Presidential action; 139 courts have reviewed the ITC's
determinations. 40 In escape clause proceedings, the President has 60
days after an ITC affirmative finding to determine what import relief
he shall provide; 14 1 courts have reviewed escape clause proceedings. 42
In Section 301 actions, a determination not to initiate an investiga-
tion or a negative USTR determination would be reviewable as final.
For affirmative decisions, the USTR recommendation, followed within
30 days by a Presidential decision, could be an apt point to determine
ripeness. As in section 201 review, the Presidential decision to take
action will have already been made, and a court could determine
whether the USTR and the President have exceeded their Congres-
sional delegation. 43 In the third scenario, courts could review deci-
135. Abbott Laboratories, supra note 109, at 148-49 (1967); see also Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U.S. 103, 108 (1969) ("[T]he question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.")
136. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
137. Canadian Meat Council, supra note 130, at 1125, 1128 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
138. See, e.g., Huffy Corp. v. United States, 604 F.Supp. 1250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
139. 19 U.S.C. § 13370) (Supp. V 1987).
140. See, e.g., Corning Glass, supra note 97, at 1559; Duracell, supra note 98, at 1578.
141. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1980).
142. See, e.g., Maple Leaf Fish, supra note 92, at 86.
143. Nonetheless, review of Executive decisions before actual relief may run afoul of the
court's jurisdiction because the President may deem the court's opinion to be an advisory opinion
and disregard it. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); see also Waterman, supra note
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sions once the President takes action without necessarily embarrassing
the United States. Finally, even if courts could not review Section 301
actions in some situations because of embarrassment problems, they
could still review them in non-embarrassing contexts. 144 Embarrass-
ment and ripeness do not seem to bar judicial review of Section 301 on
"political question" grounds.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE
Courts have declined to review some Presidential decisions because
they involve national defense secrets into which the courts generally
do not intrude. The lead Supreme Court decision which examined
Presidential discretion in the foreign affairs context, Chicago & South-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., found that a major, if not
the main, reason for denying review of Presidential discretion is the
limited justiciability resulting from the need for secrecy of certain Ex-
ecutive information:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports
neither are nor ought to be published to the world. It would be intolera-
ble that courts, without the relevant information, should review and per-
haps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret. 145
In Waterman, an airline company had protested the award of an inter-
national air route to another company. Under the statute then in ef-
fect, the Civil Aeronautics Board would recommend the proper
distribution of foreign air routes to the President, and the President
could approve, deny, transfer, amend, cancel or suspend the recom-
mendation. 46 Although the statute granted judicial review for Board
actions over domestic routes,' 47 the court found that the Presidential
discretion regarding the foreign routes was not reviewable, neither
under the statute nor because of the need for secrecy. 148
Although never reversed, the Waterman holding has been eroded
through the evolution of the political question and state secrets doc-
trine. The political question doctrine, as formulated by Brennan four-
132, at 113-14 ("It has been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render
no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review
by administrative action."). The need for binding opinions casts doubt over judicial review in
section 201 and 337 cases. See Maple Leaf Fish, supra note 92, at 86 (review of section 201);
Duracell, supra note 98, at 1578 (review of section 337).
144. See supra text accompanying note 99.
145. Waterman, supra note 132, at 111.
146. Civil Aeronautics Act, Ch. 9, 49 U.S.C. § 601 (repealed 1958).
147. Id. § 646 (repealed 1958).
148. Waterman, supra note 132.
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teen years after Waterman, made no mention of the need for Executive
secrets, but only referred to the need for Executive respect. Perhaps
Brennan felt that Executive Privilege had no place in analyzing polit-
ical questions because Executive Privilege gives rise to an autonomous
body of law as part of the state secrets doctrine. Thus, if the Presiden-
tial discretion over foreign air routes is not a political question after
Baker v. Carr, then the state secrets doctrine could prevent review of
Presidential discretion. Moreover, since the state secrets doctrine has
evolved considerably since Waterman, perhaps Waterman itself is no
longer good law. 149
The state secrets privilege protects the Executive from revealing
certain information necessary to military, diplomatic, or intelligence
activities. When national security and individual rights clash, courts
must establish guidelines to distinguish between that information
which the President could legally protect and that which must be sur-
rendered. 50 Five years after Waterman, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a three-part approach to determine issues of state secrets. 15'
First, the privilege must be properly invoked: "[1] There must be a
formal claim of privilege, [2] lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter, [3] after actual personal considera-
tion by that officer;" the underlying facts must then usually be submit-
ted to the court in a sealed affidavit for in camera review.152 Second,
the court "must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate
for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect."' 53  If the court
decides to uphold the claim of privilege, the privilege is absolute and
"even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege."' 154
The state secrets privilege generally involves military affairs, not
trade wars. For example, in Reynolds, the Court held that the official
accident report of the crash of an Air Force B-29 bomber was privi-
149. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102 (2d ed. 1988) ("despite emphasis on
judicially manageable standards, Waterman is something of a deviant case.").
150. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) ("Absent a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the
argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications
is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.").
151. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
152. Id. at 7-8. The D.C. Circuit has found the privilege's invocation to necessitate "a deci-
sion of policy made at the highest level of the executive branch after consideration of the facts of
the particular case." Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
153. Reynolds, supra note 151, at 8.
154. Id. at 11.
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leged as a military secret. 5 5 In more recent cases, the D.C. Circuit
ruled that Defense Department documents concerning sales of F-18
fighter aircraft to foreign governments were covered by the privi-
lege,15 6 and that CIA surveillance and interception of foreign commu-
nications during the Vietnam War were state secrets under the
privilege. 15 7
Even for military affairs, the state secrets privilege does not pre-
clude all judicial review. The Supreme Court recently allowed judicial
review of CIA hiring decisions. ' 58 Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist reiterated that:
[t]he District Court has the latitude to control any discovery process
which may be instituted so as to balance respondent's need for access to
proof which would support a colorable constitutional claim against the
extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the protection of
its methods, sources, and mission.' 59
If the state secrets privilege does not prevent review of CIA hiring
decisions, then trade decisions are arguably also reviewable.
Furthermore, the Court of International Trade, in adjudicating
trade cases, has also not found the state secrets privilege to be abso-
lute. In Republic Steel Corp., the Court rejected Waterman for the
context of international trade and declined to protect two cables from
the Department of Commerce to the American Embassy in Bucharest,
Romania which described conversations between the Ambassador of
Romania to the United States and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Import Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.1 60 The
Court distinguished international trade from military secrets or civil
aviation by noting that
[t]he privilege is being asserted here in the context of a comprehensive
statutory scheme for the judicial review of these administrative acts. A
conclusory assertion of privilege is not sufficient to deny plaintiffs access
to material which is part of the record on which the contested decision is
made. 161
The Court of International Trade, though, has not released all
155. Id. at 1.
156. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
157. Halkin, supra note 152, at 977.
158. Webster v. Doe, 56 U.S.L.W. 4568 (U.S. June 15, 1988).
159. Id. at 4571; but see id. at 4571 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[t]he authority of the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence to control access to sensitive national security information by dis-
charging employees deemed to be untrustworthy flows primarily from [the] Constitutional power
of the President, and Congress may surely provide that the inferior federal courts are not used to
infringe on the President's constitutional authority;" id. at 4574 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (national
security concerns are beyond judicial review).
160. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 538 F.Supp. 422 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
161. Id. at 423.
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state documents related to trade. In Star-Kist Foods, the United States
sought to supplement the administrative record in a countervailing
duty determination with cables and internal memoranda from the
USTR and the Departments of Commerce and State,1 62 and moved for
a protective order for the documents. The court agreed to the protec-
tive order and refused their release to petitioner's counsel. Although
the Court found that it had the power to release the documents, it
conducted an in camera review and found that the release "would pose
a 'reasonable danger' to national security."' 163
The state secrets privilege should not be a complete bar to the ad-
judication of trade issues. A court should instead examine whether
the documents sought in the Section 301 review contained state
secrets. If they do, the court could disallow their use, and, as in Star-
Kist Foods, the party seeking discovery would have to continue its ac-
tion without that information. If the documents were not privileged as
state secrets, then the court would allow their use. In short, the case-
by-case analysis dictated by Reynolds would reach the result in Water-
man for true problems of state secrets while permitting full review of
non-sensitive Executive determinations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Congressional delegation of Section 301 authority for import
relief cannot have granted the President a blank check in international
trade. Instead, Section 301 provides statutory relief under specified
circumstances. Although courts may not review Presidential discre-
tion, they can review certain aspects of Section 301 relief, and seeing
that neither the "political question" nor state secrets doctrines present
significant bars to judicial review, challenges to Section 301 proceed-
ings are a distinct possibility.
162. Star-Kist Foods v. United States, 600 F.Supp 212 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
163. Id. at 216.
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